Acquire or Integrate the Provider? The Dilemma of a Company: a Model of Game Theory Applied
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37467/gka-revtechno.v7.1980Keywords:
Business Strategies, Imperfect Information, Signs, Business Cooperation, ProvidersAbstract
Sometimes, the size of a company exceeds the level of sales and generates losses; to reduce them, it is proposed that the company incorporates its supplier. Such incorporation can be done in two ways: i) acquire it completely, or ii) associate it. An imperfect information model is built for the company, and the types of suppliers that exist are determined. Based on a signal from the provider, a threshold is derived from which it is beneficial for the company to incorporate the supplier. In addition, 50% could be granted to the provider if it is of healthy finances.
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