TY - JOUR AU - Aguado Franco, Juan Carlos AU - de las Heras Camino, David PY - 2012/03/06 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - Cooperation in Social Dilemmas JF - SOCIAL REVIEW. International Social Sciences Review / Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales JA - revSOCIAL VL - 1 IS - 2 SE - Research articles DO - 10.37467/gka-revsocial.v1.1220 UR - https://journals.eagora.org/revSOCIAL/article/view/1220 SP - AB - <p>Social dilemmas are situations in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. Prisoner's Dilemma is the best-known game depicting situations of this sort, but there are other such games. Two other games can be created by switching the relative value of the outcomes: the Assurance Game and the Chicken Game. Whereas mutual cooperation is the goal for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Assurance Game, that is not necessarily the case for the Chicken Game; if one person can provide a joint benefit, then it may make no sense for the second person to duplicate the effort. In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome. If the game result is infinitely repeated, cooperation may be a Nash equilibrium although both players defecting always remains an equilibrium. Multiple-person social dilemmas are examined.</p> ER -